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the additur in the federal courts. The additur has a definite value in facilitating judicial administration and the position taken by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
instant case may indicate to the changed personnel of the Supreme Court a method by
which the unduly restrictive decision in Dimick v. Schiedi may be avoided.
Despite the apparent absence of limitation upon its adoption, 8 the additur has received comparatively little recognition in the state courts. 9 In a few cases its use has
been expressly overruled, but these decisions may be distinguished on the ground that
there was some question as to whether the defendant was liable at all since there was
either an express finding of no liability, ° or the damages awarded by the jury were
merely nominal." In Illinois the device seems to be limited to cases where the inadequacy of the verdict is due to the omission of some specific, definitely calculable
item.12 Some courts, however, have permitted the use of the additur in cases where the
deficiency in the damages awarded cannot be accurately fixed.3 Thus, in Gaffney v.
Illingsworlh4the New Jersey court approved the trial judge's conditional denial of the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Where the trial judge is given the power to set aside
a verdict and order a new trial solely on the ground of inadequate damages,s there
seems to be no objection to allowing the defendant to avoid the expense of retrial by
consenting to an increase in the verdict to the least amount which the court would have
6
approved in the first place.'
Sales-Implied Warranty-Liability of Restaurateur to Customer's Guest-[England].-The plaintiffs, husband and wife, entered a restaurant and each ordered food.
The wife's subsequent illness was caused by contaminated fish served by the defendant.
She brought this action for breach of an implied warranty of fitness; her husband who
paid for the meals claimed special damages for the expenses of her illness. Held, recovery granted both plaintiffs. The court found an implied contract between the wife
8 The Seventh Amendment applies only to the federal courts, Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S.

(,877). Most state constitutions do not follow the narrow language employed in the Seventh Amendment, 44 Yale L.J. 318, 322 (1934).
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9 Note 32 Mich. L. Rev. 538 (1934).
1oShanahan v. Boston & N.St. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 412, 79 N.E. 751 (,907); Goldsmith v.
Detroit, J. & C. Ry. Co., i65 Mich. I77, 130 N.W. 647 (I91I).
"1Bradwell v. W.E. Ry. Co., i39 Pa. 404, 2o Atl. io46 (I89I); Lorf v. Detroit, 14s Mich.
265, io8 N.W. 661 (igo6).
"2Carr v. Miner, 42111. 179 (i866); James v. Morey, 44 . 352 (1867). See also Autman v.
Thompson, 19 Fed. 490 (C.C. Minn. 1884); E. Tris Napier Co. v. Glass, i5o Ga. 561, io4 S.E.
230 (1920); Clark v. Henshaw Motor Co., 246 Mass. 386, I4O N.E. 593 (1923).
13Marsh v. Minn. Brewing Co., 92 Minn. 182, 99 N.W. 63o (19o4); Ford v. Minn. Street
Ry. Co., 98 Minn. 96, 107 N.W. 817 (I9O6); Bernard v. City of No. Yakima, 8o Wash. 472,
141 Pac. 1034 (i914); Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924).

X49o NJ.L. 490, ior AtI. 243 (,917) (an action for personal injuries).
Such power has been recognized in the federal courts, Lincoln v. Power, 151 U.S. 436,
438 (1893); United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 254 Fed. 284 (C.C.A. 8th I918).
'6 Under Wisconsin practice a new trial is ordered unless the plaintiff consents to a judgment for the least amount a jury could reasonably award and the defendant consents to a judgment for the greatest amount a jury could reasonably award, Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis.
370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
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and the restaurant on which it allowed her to base an implied warranty from the
defendant. Lockett v. Charles,Ltd.z
In order to allow the plaintiff wife to recover for the breach of an implied warranty
of fitness, the court was forced to find an implied contract between her and the defendant where a layman's rules of etiquette would find none. It was able to do so by
laying down the proposition that when two people, whether or not husband and wife,
order food in a restaurant, each makes himself liable for the price of the food, regardless
of the arrangement between the two for the ultimate distribution of the expense. This
situation is to be contrasted with the one in which one person arranges a banquet,
for here the contract is clearly between the one "in charge of the proceedings" and the
hotel or restaurant, and presumably guests made ill by the food could not recover
damages on a warranty theory but would be limited to a negligence action.
The legal relations of restaurateur and customer have been frequently the subject
of notes.2 Some jurisdictions hold a restaurateur liable to a customer only for negligence, a few aiding the plaintiff with the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur or negligence
per se for the violation of a public health or pure food statute. These jurisdictions hold
that the providing of food by a restaurateur is not a sale but merely the providing of a
service.3 The more modern view is that a restaurateur sells food as does a retailer, and is
liable for defective food on an implied warranty theory, which in effect is the imposition of absolute liability.4
The interesting problem presented in the present case was the court's handling of
the legal position of the woman plaintiff so as to allow her to maintain her action on an
implied warranty theory. The fact that the court went to great lengths to establish an
implied (in fact) contract between the wife and the restaurant may indicate that its
holding has somewhat the character of a legal fiction, and as such may not always give
adequate relief to a non-purchaser who has been damaged by unfit food. Thus the
court implied that banquet guests could not maintain an action on an implied warranty
1159 L.T.R. 547 (K. B. D. 1938).
226 Mich. L. Rev. 461 and 825 (1928);
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(r934); 2 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 653 ('935); 24 Georgetown L. J. io3i (1936);
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218 (1936); 20 Minn. L. Rev. 527 (1936); z5 Chicago Kent Rev. 253 (1937).

3Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed. 519 (D.C. N.Y. r914); Bigelow v. Maine Cent. Ry. Co.,
zio Me. zo5, 85 At. 396 (r912); Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 At. 533 (1914); Rowe v.
L. and N.R. Co., 29 Ga. App. i1, 113 S.E. 823 (1922); Kenney v. Wong Len, 8i N.H. 427,
128 At. 343 (1925); Nisky v. Childs Co., io3 N.J.L. 464, 135 Atl. 8o5 (z927); Rickner v. Ritz
Restaurant Co., 13 N.J. Misc. 818, i8i At. 398 (i935); Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler,
,97 AU. Io5 (Md. 1938).
4 Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, i2o N.E. 407 (1918); Greenwood v. John
R. Thompson Co., 213 Mll. App. 371 (i919) (distinguishing Sheffer v. Willoughby, x63 III. 518,
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N.E. 253 (I896) on ground that the older case involved only the question of negligence); Bar-

ringer v. Ocean Steamship Co., 240 Mass. 4o5, 134 N.E. 265 (1922); Smith v. Carlos, 215 Mo.
App. 488, 247 S.W. 468 (1923); Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y. 344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924); Heise
v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551, 149 N.E. 182 (1925); Smith v. Gerrish, 256 Mass. 183, 152 N.E.
318 (1926); Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 674, 59 P. (2d) 44 (936); Goetten v. Owl
Drug Co., 6 Cal. (2d) 683, 59 P. (2d) 142 (1936); Schuler v. Union News Co., 4 N.E. (2d) 465
(Mass. 1936); Lewis v. Roescher, 193 Ark. i61, 98 S.W. (2d) 956 (1936); Stanfield v. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P. (2d) 878 (1936); Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F. (2d) 864 (App.
D.C. 1936).
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theory. In Bishop v. Webers the court by dictum said that, where guests are entertained
without pay, it is hard to establish an implied contract between the caterer, who is
hired by those in charge, and each guest. And in cases of unfit food purchased from a
retailer, no contract can fairly be implied between the retailer and every member of th e
family. In Gearingv. Berkson 6 the wife purchased meat as agent for her husband. Both
were made ill, but only the husband was allowed to recover for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness, and since the defendant was found not guilty of negligence, the
wife was without remedy. And in actions against a processor of food in sealed packages
the doctrine of an implied contract likewise fails. In Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy7
the plaintiff's employer was the purchaser. The court said that therefore the plaintiff
could not maintain an action on an implied warranty.
Since the implied contract doctrine thus is inadequate, perhaps the third-party beneficiary doctrine would provide a more adequate remedy for non-purchasers. In England, however, a court could not allow recovery on this theory because it does not enforce an ordinary third-party contract.8 American courts, which could base a recovery
on this theory, do not seem to have favored it. In Giminez v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. the court rather tartly disposed of the suggestion by saying: "We do not overlook the fact that a sort of third party beneficiary rule might have been invoked to give
the husband a cause of action in contract. The answer to that contention is that the
courts have never gone so far as to recognize warranties for the benefit of third persons."9 In Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros., Inc.o the court, in a more satisfactory discussion of the inapplicability of this doctrine, said the obstacle was that the benefit accruing to third parties is merely incidental and that the contract of sale was not intended
to create an obligation of the seller to them. But in Dryden v. ContinentalBaking Co."r
the court, allowing a non-purchaser recovery on a negligence theory, said that it might
12
well be argued that the wife was a third party beneficiary of the contract.
If, as the Connecticut court said in the Borucki case, the contracting parties must
intend to create an obligation of the-seller to the non-purchaser before such non-purchaser can come within the protection of the third party beneficiary doctrine,3 it seems
that the adoption of this theory would advance one step beyond the implied contract
5 139 Mass. 411,

N.E. I54 (1885).
6 223 Mass. 257 , Ii N.E. 785 (r916).
N.Y. 1, i96 N.E. 6r7 (r935). For other cases in which non-purchasers have been denied recovery because of lack of privity of contract, see: Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y
468, x3g N.E. 576 (1923); Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. go5 (1927); Binion v.
Sasaki, 5 Cal. App. (2d) 15, 41 P. (2d) 585 (i935); Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores, 88 N. H1.
409, I9o Atl. 280 (1937).
82
Williston, Contracts § 360 (rev. ed. I936); 4 Page, Contracts § 2380 (2d ed. 1920).
9 264 N.Y. 390, 395, i91 N.E. 27, 29 (I934).
10.3 A. (2d) 224 (Conn. 1938).
Xii Cal. (2d) 33, 77 P. (2d) 833 (1938).
12 There are two types of lack of privity, and two types of third party beneficiary contracts
have been suggested to allow a plaintiff not in privity with the defendant to maintain a contract action. The Dryden case suggests a third party contract between the purchaser and seller
on which a non-purchasercan base a contract action; in Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio
App. 475, 16i N.E. 557 (1928), it was suggested that the contract between the retailer and
manufacturer was for the benefit of the sub-purchaser. This note is concerned with the former
type.
'3 See 2 Williston, Contracts § 3 56A (rev. ed. 1936).
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doctrine, in that it would probably allow banquet guests to recover from the restaurateur for illness caused by defective food. But, unless the purchaser from a retailer goes
through the formality of informing the seller that the food is to be eaten by members of
his family, the doctrine would probably not extend the protection of a warranty to
such non-purchasers. Hence it seems desirable to place a non-purchaser's rights on a
less fictional basis. In Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons14 the plaintiff suffered injuries caused by broken glass in a bottle of the defendant's product which she had been
given by a friend who was the purchaser. The court allowed the plaintiff to recover on
an implied warranty theory, holding that an implied warranty inures to the benefit of
anyone who comes into rightful possession of the product. This rule, although it is an
obvious tour deforce, is simple and adequate, if the courts wish to extend absolute lia-

bility.
Since the practical problem in these cases is simple, it is fair to wonder why courts
have complicated the discussion with privity of contract. It seems that courts which
have allowed the purchaser to maintain an action for breach of an implied warranty
have done so because they felt that one engaged in the distribution of food, whether as a
restaurateur, retailer, or processor, should be liable even in the absence of negligence.
With a contract concept thus the basis of the remedy of a tort victim,5 the courts generally have proceeded to use this concept to limit recovery to purchasers, although the
menace of unfit food to non-purchasers is just as great. This limitation of liability may
have been the result of conceptual jurisprudence or of a deliberate intention of courts to
limit a seller's or processor's liability.
The privity concept has been used in other types of cases deliberately to limit liability to parties to the contract. In UltramaresCorp. v. Touche, 6 the court used this
technique to limit liability for negligent misrepresentation to parties to the contract.
The policy was the court's desire to save the defendant from liability to an indefinite
class.
Since the use of this concept to limit recovery on the negligence theory in the chattel
cases is now subject to many exceptions,17 it seems obvious that there is nothing in the
concept which compels limitation of liability to parties to the contract. Hence its applicability in the warranty of food cases may be doubted. And if the policy of the courts
in these cases, as in the negligent misrepresentation cases, has been the result of fears
that the seller would be made liable to an indefinite class, it is clear that the policy has
little application in the warranty of food cases. Unfit food generally exhausts its capacity to do harm when it reaches its first victim; negligent words may continue to be relied on, or may be relied on simultaneously by an indefinitely large class of persons.
14 145 Miss. 876, XiISo. 305 (1927). Note that in this case there was alack of privity in
both senses discussed in note 12 supra. In Mississippi the manufacturer-consumer gap had
already been bridged in Rainwater v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95
So. 444 (1923). Also note that the court in the Lyons case discussed a basis of liability closely
resembling that advanced by the English court in the instant case, but preferred to base its
decision upon the broader theory that the warranty runs with the title to the goods.
IsAlthough a warranty action today is commonly regarded as based upon contract, it
seems that the action more closely resembles a tort remedy. See i Williston, Sales § 197;
2 Williston, Sales § 614 (2d ed. 1924).
16 255 N.Y. 170, z74 N.E. 441 (1931).
'7 Harper, Torts § xo6 (1933).
18For a discussion of this quality of defective chattels, see Labatt, Negligence in Relation
to Privity of Contract, 6 L. Q. Rev. 168, 188 (xgoo).
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Thus, although the rule that the implied warranty inures to the benefit of whoever
comes into rightful possession of the product is more satisfactory than the implied
contract or third party beneficiary solution discussed above, it would be preferable for
courts to determine how far they wish to extend a food seller's or maker's absolute liability and to apply the rule as one of tort law, rather than to couch absolute liability
in terms of contracts and warranties.
Torts-Liability of Charitable Institutions for Negligence of Employees-I]linois].
-The plaintiff, an infant, was placed in a crib in the nursery of the defendant hospital
together with several other infants. Due to the negligence of the members of the hospital staff, the adjoining crib, over which an improvised incubator had been placed
with defective electric wiring, was set on fire, burning the inmate of the crib to death
and injuring the plaintiff when the fire spread to his crib. The trial court set aside a
verdict for the plaintiff, awarding him substantial damages for the personal injuries.
Held, in affirming the trial court's action, that a charitable corporation organized not
for pecuniary profit, which derives its funds mainly from public and private charity,
holds them in trust for the objects and purposes expressed in its charter, and is not liable for the negligence of its servants and employees. Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital.,
The instant case follows the view adopted by the majority of the jurisdictions that
charitable corporations, such as hospitals, which are operated not for profit, are not
liable to beneficiaries for personal injuries caused by the negligence of their servants
or employees. The reason for the rule has been predicated on a number of different theories.2 Many courts have modified this rule of absolute immunity to the extent that
charitable hospitals may be liable to their patients where due care was not used in selecting competent servants and employees,3 or where the patient has paid for services
rendered,4 or where the hospital has made an express contract to give certain accom1 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N.E. (2d) 1012 (I938).
2 (x) "trust fund" theory; (2) "public policy" theory; (3) "governmental agency" theory;
(4) "waiver" theory; (5) "respondeat superior" theory; (6) "independent contractor" theory.
A minority of states have refused to exempt charitable institutions from liability on the basis
of any of these theories. See Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392,
175 N.W 699 (1920); City of Shawnee v. Roush, ioi Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1923); Glavin v.
Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411 (1879) (overruled by statute passed by the Rhode Island
legislature). For a full discussion and criticism of these various theories see: Feezer, The Tort
Liability of Charities, 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 19i (1928); Ruback, Immunity of Charitable Corporations for Negligence of Their Servants and Agents, 12 St. John's L. Rev. 99 (i937); Sefi,
Liability of Private Charitable Corporations for the Torts of Their Agents and Servants, 2
John Marshall L. Q. 234 (1936). See also Harper, Torts § 294 (1934); 2 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 4oi (I935).
3For example, see Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home &Hospital, 2o4 Ohio St. 6i, 135 N.E.
287 (1922); Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925);
Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (i918); 86 A.L.R. 491, 4954 See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (I915); Sisters of Sorrowful
Mother of Zeidiler, 82 P. (2d) 996 (Okla. 1938); Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints'
Hospital, 82 P. (2d) 849 (Idaho 1938); Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n,
78 P. (2d) 645 (Utah 1938). In Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y.
i63, 7 N.E. (2d) 28 (I937) the court held a charitable hospital liable to a pay patient when in-

